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From think to remember:
how CPs and NPs combine with attitudes in Buryat *
Tatiana Bondarenko
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract In this paper I investigate a case of factivity alternation in Barguzin Buryat
(Mongolic): the verb hanaxa is naturally translated as ‘think’ when it combines with
finite CP clauses, but as ‘remember’ when it combines with nominalized clauses.
I argue that the ‘remember’ meaning is a result of a pre-existence presupposition
associated with the verb’s Theme argument: it is presupposed that the Theme exists
prior to the event described by the verb. I propose that the factivity alternation
arises due to the different ways in which CPs and nominal expressions combine
with the verb semantically: while nominals saturate the Theme argument which has
the pre-existence presupposition associated with it, CPs combine by modifying the
event argument of the verb (Kratzer 2013, 2016; Elliott 2017).
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1 Introduction
In this paper I discuss a case of factitivy alternation (Moulton 2009; Abrusán 2011;
Özyıldız 2017) in Barguzin Buryat (Mongolic family).1 This language has a verb
hanaxa, which, when combines with indicative CPs, (1), is naturally translated as
‘think’, but when combines with nominalized clauses (NMNs) or nouns, (2), is
naturally translated as ‘remember, think of’.
(1) dugar
Dugar.NOM
[CP mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:
eat-PST
g9ž9]
COMP
han-a:
think-PST
‘Dugar OKthought /*remembered (“thought of”) that a cat ate fish.’
* I would like to thank Sabine Iatridou and Kai von Fintel, Ömer Demirok and Deniz Özyıldız, Elizabeth
Bogal-Allbritten, Danny Fox, Martin Hackl, Irene Heim, Mitya Privoznov, Roger Schwarzschild,
Sergei Tatevosov, members of the MSU Altaic fieldwork expeditions, and the audiences of LFRG
(MIT), WAFL14 and SALT29 for helpful comments and discussion. This study has been supported
by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (grant #19-012-00627 A). All errors are my own.
1 The data presented in this paper has been gathered during fieldwork in village Baraghan (Kurumkan
district, Republic of Buryatia, Russia) in 2017-2018.
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(2) a. dugar
Dugar.NOM
[NMN mi:sg9i-n
cat-GEN
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:S-i:j9-n’]
eat-PART-ACC-3SG
han-a:
think-PST
‘Dugar *thought /OKremembered (“thought of”) a cat’s eating fish.’
b. dugar
Dugar.NOM
mi:sg9j-9
cat-ACC
han-a:
think-PST
‘Dugar *thought /OKremembered (“thought of”) a cat.’
In (2a), unlike in (1), there is an inference that at some time prior to the time of
Dugar’s attitude, a cat ate fish. This inference makes it infelicitous to follow up (2a)
by saying “but the cat didn’t eat the fish”. The sentences in (3)-(4) show that such
contradiction arises only with nominalizations, but not with CPs.
(3) # dugar
Dugar
mi:sg9i-n
cat-GEN
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:S-i:j9-n’
eat-PART-ACC-3SG
han-a:
think-PST
xarin
but
mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:-güi
eat-PST-NEG
# ‘Dugar remembered a cat’s eating fish, but a cat didn’t eat fish.’
(4) dugar
Dugar
mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:
eat-PST
g9ž9
COMP
han-a:
think-PST
xarin
but
mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:-güi
eat-PST-NEG
‘Dugar thought that a cat ate fish, but a cat didn’t eat fish.’
The goal of this paper is to provide an account of the difference between (1) and
(2) and how it comes about. The hypothesis that I will pursue is that the meaning of
hanaxa is uniform across its uses, and that the difference in meaning, (1)-(2), arises
due to the combination of two things: argument structure of the attitude verb and the
two distinct ways in which NPs and CPs combine with attitude predicates.
More precisely, I will follow a version of the Kratzerian semantics for attitude
verbs (Kratzer 2013, 2016; Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017; Elliott 2017) and argue that
Buryat CPs combine by modifying the event argument of hanaxa, while nominals
combine by saturating the Theme argument of the verb, which denotes the object of
thought — what is being thought about. I propose that hanaxa has a pre-existence
presupposition associated with its Theme argument: the object of thought has to exist
before the eventuality described by the matrix verb. I argue that this presupposition
gives rise to the ‘remember’ translation when the Theme argument is saturated by a
nominal and remains undetected when no NP is combined.
The proposal presented in this paper is different from both proposals that build
the factive inference into the denotation of the verb (Hintikka 1969; Percus 2006) and
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proposals that build the inference into the complement clause (Kiparsky & Kiparsky
1970; Kratzer 2006; Kastner 2015; Hanink & Bochnak 2017). While I propose that
the attitude verb comes with a presupposition, it is not a presupposition that some
proposition p is true, but just a condition on what kind of internal arguments the
attitude verb can combine with. This provides a new view of the factive inference as
a restriction on an individual argument of the attitude verb.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I provide evidence that the
observed inference is indeed a presupposition. Section 3 explores possible alterna-
tives to the proposal argued for in this paper: the ambiguity hypothesis (3.1), the
hypothesis that the presupposition is coming from the complement (3.2), and the
hypothesis that the presupposition is coming from the matrix verb (3.3). In section
4 I present my proposal. Section 5 provides additional evidence for the proposal,
which comes from a different kind of nominalization (nominalized CP), and section
6 concludes the paper.
2 The observed inference is a presupposition
As we have seen in (3)-(4), denying the truth of the complement leads to a contra-
diction when hanaxa takes a nominalization as its complement, but not when it takes
a finite clause as its complement. Another contrast can be observed in (5)-(6), where
the speaker explicitly says that they are ignorant about the truth of the complement.
(5) # bi
1SG.NOM
badma
Badma.NOM
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:
break-PST
gü
Q
g9ž9
COMP
m9d9-n9-güi-b,
know-PRS-NEG-1SG
(xarin)
(but)
sajana
Sajana.NOM
badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
t9rg9
cart
9mdl-9:S-i:j9
break-PART-ACC
han-a:
think-PST
# ‘I don’t know whether Badma broke the cart, (but) Sajana remembered
that Badma broke the cart.’
(6) bi
1SG.NOM
badma
Badma.NOM
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:
break-PST
gü
Q
g9ž9
COMP
m9d9-n9-güi-b,
know-PRS-NEG-1SG
(xarin)
(but)
sajana
Sajana.NOM
badma
Badma.NOM
t9rg9
cart
9mdl-9:
break-PST
g9ž9
COMP
han-a:
think-PST
‘I don’t know whether Badma broke the cart, (but) Sajana thought that
Badma broke the cart.’
These examples show that the speaker must believe the complement of hanaxa
to be true when this verb combines with a nominalization. Examples (7) and (8)
show that the observed inference is a presupposition: it survives under question
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and negation. The inference that seems to project in these sentences is that there
is an event of Badma breaking the cart in the actual world that existed before the
evaluation time.2
(7) # bi
1SG.NOM
badma
Badma.NOM
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:
break-PST
gü
Q
g9ž9
COMP
m9d9-n9-güi-b,
know-PRS-NEG-1SG
sajana
Sajana.NOM
badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:S-i:j9
break-PART-ACC
hana-na
think-PRS
gü?
Q
# ‘I don’t know whether Badma broke the cart or not. Does Sajana remember
Badma’s breaking the cart?’
(8) # badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:S-i:j9
break-PART-ACC
sajana
Sajana.NOM
han-a:-güi,
think-PST-NEG
badma
Badma.NOM
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:-güi
break-PST-NEG
# ‘Sajana didn’t remember Badma’s breaking the cart, (and) Badma didn’t
break the cart.’
Thus, we can conclude that the inference at hand is a presupposition.
3 On the source of the presupposition: exploring alternatives
There could be several hypotheses about the origin of a factive presupposition (see
discussion in Özyıldız 2016). In this section, I will discuss three alternatives to
my own proposal: the hypothesis that there are two distinct homophonous attitude
verbs, a factive and a non-factive one, 3.1, the hypothesis that the presupposition
is due to the meaning of the complement clause, 3.2, and the hypothesis that the
presupposition is due to the lexical meaning of the attitude verb, 3.3. I will argue
that, given the Buryat data, all these alternatives are difficult to pursue.
3.1 The ambiguity hypothesis
According to the ambiguity hypothesis, a factivity alternation can arise because a
language can have two disctinct but homophonous lexical entries for an attitude
verb, a factive and a non-factive one. The factive hanaxa1 would always select for a
nominal complement, while the non-factive hanaxa2 would always select for a CP.
An empirical argument against this hypothesis can be provided: it is possible for
hanaxa to combine with both a nominalization and a CP at the same time, (9).
2 I leave the question of how exactly the presupposition projects in these cases for future research.
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(9) sajana
Sajana.NOM
[NMN badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
xurumxa:n-ha:
Kurumkan-ABL
j9r-9:d
come-CONV2
bai-ga:S-i:j9-n’]
be-PART-ACC-3
[CP g9r-t9
house-DAT
xulgaiSan
burglar.NOM
or-o:
go.in-PST
g9-ž9]
say-CONV
han-a:
think-PST
‘Sajana remembered (“thought of”) of the/an event of Badma returning from
Kurumkan, (thinking) that a burglar entered the house.’
In (9) the finite clause describes the thoughts of the attitude holder, while the
nominalization describes an event (Badma returning from Kurumkan) which is
the topic of Sajana’s thoughts. There is an inference that this event has occured,
and it happened before the time of Sajana’s thinking. Examples like (9) cannot
be accounted for under the ambiguity hypothesis, since it presupposes distinct
lexical entries for hanaxa when it combines with CPs and when it combines with
nominalizations, but here we see a case of it combining with both at the same time.
3.2 The presupposition comes from the complement
Another hypothesis is that the factive presupposition arises due to the complement
of the verb (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970; Kratzer 2006; Kastner 2015; Hanink &
Bochnak 2017). This hypothesis seems initially attractive due to the cross-linguistic
data that suggests that there are correlations found between the syntactic category of
the complement of attitude verbs and their factivity (Moulton 2009; Abrusán 2011;
Özyıldız 2017). While attractive, this approach cannot be adapted for the factivity
alternation observed in Buryat.
First, it cannot be the case that it is the nominal status that is responsible for
the factive presupposition, because the factive presupposition is not observed in all
cases when a non-factive verb takes a nominalized complement. For example, when
verbs 9tig9x9 ‘believe’ and naidaxa ‘hope’ combine with nominalizations, no factive
inference arises, hence the felicity of (10)-(11).3
(10) sajana
Sajana
badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:S-t9-n’
break-PART-DAT-3
9tig-9:,
believe-PST
xarin
but
badma
Badma
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:-güi
break-PST-NEG
3 Buryat is not unique in allowing non-factive verbs take nominalized clauses without giving rise to
the factive inference. For example, the same happens in Turkish (Özyıldız 2017). This suggests
that treating nominalizations as factive across the board cannot be the correct solution to factivity
alternations.
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‘Sajana believes that Badma broke the cart (lit. ‘in Badma’s breaking the
cart’), but Badma didn’t break the cart’.
(11) sajana
Sajana
s9s9g-9i
Seseg-GEN
xada
mountain
d9:r9
up
gar-a:Sa-da
go.to-PART-DAT
naida-na,
hope-PRS
xarin
but
s9s9g
Seseg
xada
mountain
d9:r9
up
gar-a:-güi
go.to-PST-NEG
‘Sajana hopes that Seseg went up the mountain (lit. ‘in Seseg’s going up the
mountain’), but Seseg didn’t go up the mountain’.
One can note that while hanaxa assigns accusative case to nominalizations, (2),
the verbs 9tig9x9 ‘believe’ and naidaxa ‘hope’ assign a lexical case — dative. It
could then be that the argument structure of these verbs is different: perhaps, the
nominalization is not the internal argument of the verbs like 9tig9x9 ‘believe’ and
naidaxa ‘hope’. Whether it is a matter of the argument structure or not, we see that
just the nominal status of the argument does not suffice for the factive inference to
come about.
Second, it also cannot be the case that definiteness is responsible for the observed
presupposition in Buryat (see Kastner 2015; Hanink & Bochnak 2017 for proposals
of how definiteness can lead to factivity). The nominalization under consideration
does not have to be definite, as (12) shows: there need not be a uniqueness pre-
supposition present. If the nominalization had to be definite, then (12) should have
been infelicitous under the reading that the speaker, Seseg and Narana each saw a
different event of Sajana’s singing a song.4
(12) bi
1SG
sajan-i:n
Sajana-GEN
du:
song
du:la-Za
sing-CONV
baj-ga:S-i:j9-n’
be-PART-ACC-3
xar-a:-b,
see-PST-1SG
s9s9g
Seseg
sajan-i:n
Sajana-GEN
du:
song
du:la-Za
sing-CONV
baj-ga:S-i:j9-n’
be-PART-ACC-3
xar-a:,
see-PST
narana
Narana
sajan-i:n
Sajana-GEN
du:
song
du:la-Za
sing-CONV
baj-ga:S-i:j9-n’
be-PART-ACC-3
xar-a:
see-PST
‘I saw Sajana’s singing a song, Seseg saw Sajana’s singing a song, Narana
saw Sajana’s singing a song.
OK: The three girls saw each a different singing by Sajana.
OK: The three girls all saw the same singing by Sajana.
If it is not the nominal status itself, and not definiteness, then it is not obvious
how the nominalized clause could introduce the factive inference into the sentence. I
therefore reject the hypothesis that the presupposition comes from the nominalized
4 I am grateful to Deniz Özyıldız for suggesting this diagnostic to me.
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complement. In other words, while data like (1)-(2) suggest that the type of the
complement (CP -vs- NP) correlates with the existence of a presupposition, I take
this correlation to be an epiphenomenon of the fact that CPs and NPs combine with
attitude verbs in different ways, and not as a fact suggesting that the meaning of the
nominalization has a factive presupposition written into it.
3.3 The presupposition comes from the attitude verb
Another hypothesis is that the factive presupposition is always part of the lexical
meaning of the attitude verb. Under this hypothesis, the case when the verb combines
with a nominalized clause and has the factive inference is the default case, and what
has to be explained is how this presupposition disappears in cases when the verb
combines with finite CP clauses. One possibility is to employ the notion of ‘plugs’
(Karttunen 1973) which can block presuppositions from projecting (Özyıldız 2016).
If one follows Hintikkan semantics for attitude predicates, this would require writing
into the meaning of the complement clause the requirement that the proposition
that it denotes somehow cancels the presupposition introduced by the verb. I will
not adapt ‘plugs’ as a special tool for cancelling presuppositions. However, I will
propose that the observed presupposition is partially due to the lexical meaning of
the verb.
To sum up, we have seen that among the sketched out alternative proposals some
make wrong empirical predictions (the ambiguity hypothesis and the hypothesis
that the presupposition comes from the complement), while others require special
tools (‘plugs’) which we would like to avoid adapting (the hypothesis that the
presupposition is part of the meaning of the verb). Note also that all of these
alternatives lack an explanation for why ‘think’ would become ‘remember’ and not,
for example, ‘know’. In other words, there seems to be something more than just a
factivity inference which is different between the sentences where hanaxa combines
with CPs and the sentences where hanaxa combines with nominals, and we would
like to have a proposal that captures that.
4 The proposal: factivity as a consequence of the pre-existence presupposi-
tion associated with a Theme argument
I would like to propose that the factivity alternation in Barguzin Buryat is caused
by the argument structure of the verb hanaxa — more precisely, by a pre-existence
presupposition that it has associated with its Theme argument.
If we look at non-attitude verbs, we see that internal arguments are in some way
special (compared to indirect objects and external arguments): verbs often place
restrictions on their interpretation (for example, see Diesing 1992). More specifically,
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they often specify the relation between the temporal interval that corresponds to the
existence of the internal argument and the temporal interval corresponding to the
event described by the verb:
(13) a. Mary broke a vase. ⇒ There existed a vase before the breaking event.
b. Mary read a book. ⇒ There existed a book before the reading event.
c. Mary wrote a poem. ; There existed a poem before the writing event.
As we see in (13), verbs of destruction (like break) and verbs of use (like read)
require their internal arguments to pre-exist the event described by the verb. Verbs
of creation (like write), place an opposite requirement: the individual denoted by the
internal argument has to not exist before the event described by the verb.
I would like to propose that attitude verbs, just like ordinary verbs, can place
constraints on the interpretation of their internal arguments, and these constraints
can sometimes lead to factive inferences.5 In particular, I would like to propose that
Buryat’s hanaxa ‘think’ is similar to verbs of destruction and verbs of use: it requires
that its internal argument, which denotes the topic of thoughts (= what the thinking
is about), exists before the event denoted by the verb takes place. I would like to
argue that the nominalized clauses under consideration denote properties of events,
and that they, after combining with (phonologically null) determiners, saturate the
internal argument slot of hanaxa. This leads to the presupposition that the/an event
described by the nominalization pre-exists the event described by the verb, which
leads to the factive inference on one hand, and the “remember” flavor on the other
hand: remember x ≈ think of an x that is presupposed to have existed before the
thinking event6. I would like to argue that finite CP clauses have a very different
path of combining with the verb. They are not saturating the internal argument of
the verb, and thus the pre-existence presupposition is not related to their content at
all. The main elements of my proposal are thus summarized in (14).
5 I would not, however, want to say that the constraint that hanaxa introduces is exactly identical to
the pre-existence inference observed with verbs of destruction and verbs of use in (13), because the
inference we see with hanaxa behaves like a presupposition (see section 2), while the inference of the
verbs in (13a)-(13b) does not. For example, it seems to not project from under negation:
(i) a. Mary didn’t break a vase, because there were no vases around. ; There existed a vase
before the breaking event.
b. Mary didn’t read a book, because there were no books around. ; There existed a book
before the reading event.
6 I am not suggesting that this is the meaning of remember in English, I am merely hypothesizing that
‘remember’ is the closest translation of hanaxa due to the presupposition that its internal argument
existed before the thinking event.
516
From think to remember
(14) Three main elements of the proposal:
i. Hanaxa ‘think’ takes an internal (Theme) argument (x) = topic of
thoughts, res-argument;
ii. It has a pre-existence presupposition associated with the Theme (x);
iii. NPs combine by saturating the individual argument (x), CPs do not.
My proposal is implemented in the Kratzerian (“decompositional”) approach to
semantics of attitude predicates (Kratzer 2006, 2013, 2016; Moulton 2009, 2015;
Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017; Elliott 2017). In particular, I will assume that the
quantification over possible worlds comes not from the attitude verb, but from the
complementizer (Kratzer 2006)7 and that CPs denote properties of contentfull events
(Kratzer 2013, 2016; Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017; Elliott 2017). My ontological
assumptions are the following. I assume that the domain of events, Dv, is a subdomain
of the domain of individuals De. I also assume that there is a Content function that
takes an event and returns a proposition associated with this event (Kratzer 2013;
Elliott 2017). This function is defined only for some events (for example, for
events of thinking, believing etc., but not for events of running, climbing etc.). I
assume that the events for which the Content function is defined are in the domain
Dcv, which is a subdomain of the domain of events Dv. In the next section (4.1) I
discuss the meanings of hanaxa, of the nominalization, and of CP. In sections 4.2
and 4.3 I provide derivations for sentences with the nominalization and with CP
correspondingly.
4.1 The ingredients
I propose for the Buryat’s verb hanaxa ‘think’ the semantics in (15):
(15) JhanaxaKw,g = λxλe: LB(τ(x)) < LB(τ(e)). think(x)(e) & e is in w.
(LB — Left Boundary (of a time interval),
τ — a function that takes an individual and returns the time
interval corresponding to the existence of that individual.)
The verb in (15) takes two arguments: an individual (Theme) argument x (i.e., the
res argument, what is being thought about) and an event argument e (= the thinking
event), and returns 1 iff e is an event of thinking about x and e is in w. This verb
has a pre-existence presupposition associated with the Theme (x): the left boundary
7 Elliott (2017) argues that there is no quantification over possible worlds at all: that Content of a given
event in a given world is equated with a certain proposition. While I do not adapt this view in my
paper, I think that everything I argue for is completely compatible with it.
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of the time interval corresponding to the object of thinking (x) is before the left
boundary of the time interval corresponding to the thinking event (e). Thus, while
the verb has a presupposition, it is not a factive presupposition that some proposition
is presupposed to be true. The presupposition it has is merely a restriction on the
type of the individual that the object of the verb denotes.
I assume that the experiencer of the thinking eventuality (the attitude holder) is
introduced in the course of the derivation: syntactically, by a Voice projection, and
semantically, through the process of Event Identification (Kratzer 1996) with the
contentful event argument (e) of hanaxa ‘think’ — an event that has propositional
content associated with it. Within the framework I am assuming, it seems necessary
to specify what being the experiencer of a contentful event means and how the
entailment patterns of attitude verbs are guaranteed. That is, how do we guarantee
that if B ⊆ DOX(x,w) and A ⊆ B⇒ A ⊆ DOX(x,w), where DOX(x,w) is the set
of worlds compatible with beliefs of the individual x in world w? I suggest the
following definition of the experiencer of a contentful event:8
(16) Definition: x is the experiencer of a contentful event e in w,
x = Exp(ecv)w iff ∀ w’ ∈ DOXx,w→ w’ ∈ Content(ecv).
While the definition in (16) could be written as part of the meaning of hanaxa
or the Voice head that introduces the external argument, I will, for the purpose of
simplification, omit this part of the meaning in the future discussion.
I propose that nominalized clauses under discussion denote properties of events.
For example, the denotation of the nominalization we see in (5)-(8) ‘Badma’s
breaking the cart’, is represented in (17).
(17) JBadma’s breaking the cartKw,g = λe.break(the cart)(e) & Agent(Badma)(e)
& e is in w
As we have seen in (12), the nominalization under consideration can be indefinite,
and I will use the indefinite reading of the nominalization to illustrate my analysis. I
will assume that in cases of indefinite nominalizations, Buryat uses a null existential
generalized quantifier with the semantics in (18). This quantifier takes two properties
of events and returns 1 iff there is an event that has both of them. Thus, the semantics
of the indefinite nominalization is in (19).
(18) JaKw,g = λ f in Dvt . λq in Dvt . ∃e [f(e)=1 & q(e)=1]
(19) Ja Badma’s breaking the cartKw,g = λq in Dvt .∃e [break(the cart)(e) &
Agent(Badma)(e) & e is in w & q(e)=1]
8 See discussion in Elliott 2017 on how to guaruantee the entailment patterns without appealing to
quantification over possible worlds.
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I propose that the Buryat complementizer takes a proposition p and an event e as
its arguments and returns 1 iff in all worlds compatible with propositional content
of e (i.e., in all worlds such that they are in the set of worlds that Content function
returns when applied to the event e) the proposition p is true, (20).
(20) JthatKw,g = λp in Dst .λe in Dcv. ∀w’[w’ ∈ Content(e)→ p(w’)=1].
Thus, CPs denote properties of events. For example, the CP ‘that Badma broke
the cart’ denotes a set of events such that in all worlds compatible with their propo-
sitional content Badma breaks the cart:
(21) Jthat Badma broke the cartKw,g = λe in Dcv. ∀w’[w’ ∈ Content(e) → ∃e’
[break(the cart)(e’) & e’ is in w’ & Agent(e’) = Badma]].
In the next sections I will show how, given the denotations proposed in this
section, we can derive the factivity alternation in Buryat.
4.2 Think + Nominalization
I assume the following LF for a sentence with hanaxa and a nominalization:
(22) The LF of think + indefinite NMN
DP
NMN
AspP
VoiceP
DP
Badma
Voice’
VP
DP
the cart
V
broke
Voice
Asp
NMN
D
a
8 TP
VoiceP
DP
Sajana
Voice’
VP
t8 V
think
Voice
T
∃
519
Bondarenko
Here we see an indefinite nominalization (‘(a) Badma’s breaking the cart’),
which I assume to undergo QR due to a type mismatch in the object position.9 In
(22) the nominalization leaves a trace of type e (t8) in the position it moved out of,
and this trace saturates the verb’s internal argument (x). I assume that the experiencer
of thinking is introduced by the Voice head through Event Identification. Existential
closure applies at the level of TP and “closes off” the event variable of the attitude
verb, making TP a node of type t. Then Predicate Abstraction applies, which creates
a node (the one dominating index 8 and TP in (22)) whose denotation is a set of
individuals such that there is an event of thinking about them by Sajana:
(23) J8 Sajana t8 thinkKw,g = λx ∃e: LB(τ(x)) < LB(τ(e)). think(x)(e) & e is in w
& Exp(e) = Sajana.
The indefinite nominalization, (19), combines with its sister, (23), via Function
Application10, resulting in (24): there are two events in w: e and e’, where e is an
event of thinking about e’, and e’ is an event of Badma breaking the cart.
(24) JSajana thinks of (a) Badma’s breaking the cartKw,g = 1 iff ∃e’ ∃e: LB(τ(e’))
< LB(τ(e)). [think(e’)(e) & e is in w & Exp(e)=Sajana & break(the cart)(e’)
& e’ is in w & Agent(e’)=Badma]
It is also presupposed that e’ (Badma’s breaking the cart) started existing before
e (the thinking event). I propose that this presupposition, which states that the object
of thought exists prior to thinking, is responsible for the ‘remember / recall / think
of’ meaning that arises with nominal complements of hanaxa ‘think’.11
9 Note that QR does not have any other contribution to my analysis apart from resolving the type
mismatch. One could alternatively assume that quantificational phrases are interpreted in situ due to
the availability of type-shifting; my analysis could be implemented under such a view as well.
10 I assume that although the first argument of an indefinite nominalization is a property of events, it
can also take properties which are compatible with being properties of events — like properties of
individuals (as mentioned earlier, I assume that Dv ⊂ De).
11 In (23) and (24) I am being sloppy with the notation concerning the presupposition due to an issue
that I do not have a solution to yet: the issue of presupposition projection. According to the meaning I
have proposed for the verb hanaxa ‘think’, it is a partial function: it is only defined if the left boundary
of the time interval corresponding to its internal argument is before the left boundary of the time
interval corresponding to the eventuality argument. The question is: how does this presupposition
project? How does it interact with the existential closure and the existential quantifier inside of the
nominalization? While I do not have answers to these questions, the data from section 2 suggest
the following desired conditions: the sentence JSajana thinks of (a) Badma’s breaking the cartKw,g
should be defined iff there is an event of Badma breaking the cart in w at the time interval whose LB
preceeds the LB of the time of evaluation (= time at which the matrix eventuality is evaluated); the
sentence should be true iff there exists a thinking event at the time of evaluation about an event of
Badma breaking the cart, and false iff there is no thinking event at the time of evaluation about an
event of Badma breaking the cart. I leave the question of what the theory of presupposition projection
needs to be in order to achieve the desired conditions for the further research.
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Note that in the semantics that I propose the presupposition is about the left
boundary only; it does not say anything about how the right boundary of the Theme
argument is situated with respect to the thinking event. I assume that in sentences
with nominalizations the placement of the right boundary with respect to the matrix
event is determined by the aspectual properties of the participle that forms the nomi-
nalization. So far we have seen the nominalization formed from the participle with
suffix -a:Sa, which places the right boundary before the matrix event. But the anteri-
ority of the -a:Sa-nominalization is independent of the pre-existence presupposition.
For example, nominalizations from the (future) participle with suffix -xa situate the
right boundary after the matrix event:
(25) badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
du:
song
du:la-x-i:j9
sing-FUT.PART-ACC
s9s9g
Seseg.NOM
han-a:
think-PST
‘Seseg *thought /OKremembered (“thought of”) Badma’s (planned for
some future time) singing of the song.’
In (25) the verb hanaxa still gets the ‘remember’ meaning. The event denoted
by the nominalization is presupposed to have started existing, which gives rise to the
inference that the event was planned or scheduled before the thinking event.12 The
fact that the presupposition is only about the left boundary becomes even clearer
when one looks at proper names as objects of hanaxa: in (26) Badma needs to have
started existing before the thinking event, but he doesn’t need to be dead for the
sentence to be true.
(26) sajana
Sajana.NOM
badm-i:j9
Badma-ACC
han-a:
think-PST
‘Sajana *thought /OKremembered (“thought of”) Badma.’
Another crucial feature of my proposal is that the nominalizations under con-
sideration do not have a propositional meaning: they are just properties of events. I
present two pieces of evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
First, if nominalizations denote predicates of events, then I predict that no
quantification over possible worlds is present in sentences containing them. This
means that nominalizations should be always interpreted de re and should not
describe beliefs of the attitude holder. This turns out to be true. Consider (27).
(27) badma
Badma.NOM
darim-i:n
Darima-GEN
d9n
too.much
türgö:r
quickly
maSin-a:r
car-INSTR
jab-a:S-i:j9
go-PART-ACC
hana-na,
think-PRS
xarin
but
badma
Badma.NOM
(darima)
(Darima.NOM)
d9n
too.much
türgö:r
quickly
12 I leave the details of aspectual interpretation of nominalizations for further research.
521
Bondarenko
maSin-a:r
car-INSTR
jab-a:
go-PST
g9ž9
COMP
hana-na-güi
think-PRS-NEG
Paraphrase: ‘Badma remembers the situation that the speaker thinks of as
Darima’s driving too quickly, but he doesn’t think that Darima drove too
quickly. ’
In (27) the lexical material of the nominalization and of the CP are identical. If the
nominalization denoted a proposition, this sentence would have been contradictory.
However, the sentence is felicitous, because the description of the event denoted by
the nominalization is the speaker’s description, not Badma’s.
Second, the distribution of nominalizations suggests that they denote a property
of events. Nominalizations can be referred to by the noun uSar ‘event, situation’ and,
unlike propositions, can ‘happen outside’, (28).
(28) a. sajana
Sajana.NOM
badm-i:n
Badma-GEN
t9rg9
cart
9md9l-9:S-i:j9
break-PART-ACC
han-a:
think-PST
‘Sajana remembered Badma’s breaking the cart.’
b. ... 9n9
this
uSar
event
gaza:
outside
bol-o:
become-PST
‘...This event happened outside.’
They also cannot be complements of the predicates that seem to require propo-
sitional complements. For example, arsaldaxa ‘argue’ can combine with CPs, but
not with nominalizations. If nominalizations denote properties of events, this is
expected: it is not clear how one can “argue an event”.
(29) arsaldaxa ‘argue’
a. sajana
Sajana.NOM
s9s9g
Seseg.NOM
xada
mountain
d9:r9
to
gar-a:
go-PST
g9ž9
COMP
arsalda-na
argue-PRS
‘Sajana argues that Seseg went to the mountains.’
b. * sajana
Sajana.NOM
s9s9g-9i
Seseg-GEN
xada
mountain
d9:r9
to
gar-a:S-i:j9
go-PART-ACC
arsalda-na
suspect-PRS
Intended: ‘Sajana argues that Seseg went to the mountains.’
4.3 Think + CP
I have proposed that the presupposition that hanaxa displays with nominalizations
is introduced by the verb: it is a presupposition about the time of existence of the
internal argument of the verb. CPs are not subject to this presupposition because
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they are not internal arguments of the verb. They combine with attitude verbs by
restricting their eventuality argument and specifying what set of worlds constitutes
its Content. The LF for a CP combining with hanaxa is in (30).
(30) The LF of think + CP
TP
VoiceP
DP
Sajana
Voice’
VP
CP
TP
VoiceP
DP
Badma
Voice’
VP
DP
the cart
V
broke
Voice
T
∃
C
that
V
think
Voice
T
∃
Below I repeat the semantics I propose for the attitude verb hanaxa, (15)=(31),
and for the CP clause, (21)=(32). One can see that they can be combined by Event
Identification, yielding (33)13: CP here modifies the event argument of the verb.
(31) JhanaxaKw,g = λxλe: LB(τ(x)) < LB(τ(e)). think(x)(e) & e is in w.
13 Other semantic principles could be used for combining the verb with CP as well. For example, one
could use a modified version of Restrict (Chung & Ladusaw 2003), or a modified version of Predicate
Modification. Here I use Event Identification just because it requires no modification.
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(32) Jthat Badma broke the cartKw,g = λe in Dcv. ∀w’[w’ ∈ Content(e) → ∃e’
[break(the cart)(e’) & e’ is in w’ & Agent(e’) = Badma]].
(33) Jhanaxa that Badma broke the cartKw,g = λxλe: LB(τ(x)) < LB(τ(e)).
think(x)(e) & e is in w & ∀w’[w’ ∈ Content(e)→ ∃e’ [break(the cart)(e’) &
e’ is in w’ & Agent(e’) = Badma]].
We have to assume that at this point of the derivation the Theme argument gets
existentially closed, in order to combine with the Voice head (by Event Identifi-
cation), which introduces the attitude holder. After that the event argument gets
existentially closed, resulting in (34).
(34) JSajana thinks that Badma broke the cartKw,g = 1 iff ∃x∃e: LB(τ(x)) <
LB(τ(e)). [think(x)(e) & e is in w & Exp(e) = Sajana & ∀w’[w’ ∈ Content(e)
→ ∃e’ [ break(the cart)(e’) & e’ is in w’ & Agent(e’) = Badma]]]
The presupposition of the verb is still present in the sentence with the CP, (34):
it is defined if there is some x (topic of thoughts) that existed prior to the thinking
event. But this presupposition is undetectable: there is no lexical material that
corresponds to the object x. Depending on the context, Sajana’s thoughts could be
about Badma, or about the cart, or about breakings that happened recently. Note that
an event of Badma breaking the cart is only asserted to happen in the worlds which
are quantified over, nothing requires the topic of thoughts, which is left implicit, to
be Badma’s breaking the cart.
One of the questions that arises is whether the pre-existence presupposition is
actually present when the verb combines only with CP. While it is difficult to test
this, and in this paper I assume it is still present, it is possible to imagine a way
such that it would not be present as part of the meaning in sentences with CPs. For
this, one would need to assume a strictly neo-Davidsonian approach to argument
structure, according to which all arguments, including the internal one, are severed
from the verb and are introduced by special functional projections.14 Then we could
say that the pre-existence presupposition is not written into the lexical meaning of the
verb, but is rather part of the meaning of a θT heme head that introduces the internal
argument. This move could be beneficial in two ways. First, it would guarantee
that in sentences where no nominal has been combined there is no pre-existence
presupposition present.15 Second, it would obviate the need for an ad-hoc existential
closure of the individual argument after the step in (33), where hanaxa combines
14 See Elliott 2017 for argumentation in favor of this approach.
15 Whether this result is what we want is a separate question, and a difficult one: I have not found a
way to empirically test whether the pre-existence presupposition is present when hanaxa does not
combine with nominals.
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with CP, and before the resulting structure combines with a Voice head. I leave the
question of whether this neo-Davidsonian analysis is a better option open for now.
In the proposed analysis CPs are treated as properties of events. Some evidence
in favor of this treatment of CPs in Buryat comes from morphology of the comple-
mentizer. The complementizer g9ž9 consists of two morphemes: the root of the verb
g9 ‘say’ and the suffix -ž9, which is a converbial suffix found in sentential adjuncts,
with restructuring verbs, and in analytical verb forms. For example, (35) shows this
suffix being present on a temporal adjunct.
(35) ojuna
Ojuna.NOM
üxibü:
child
tür9-ž9,
give.birth.to-CONV
badma
Badma.NOM
9s9g9
father
bolo-bo
become-PST
‘As Ojuna gave birth to a child, Badma became a father.’
If morphology reflects the denotations of these clauses, then the converbial
morphology that we see on the complementizer might indicate that finite CPs
combine with the predicate in the same way as other -ž9-bearing elements do. And
given that sentential adjuncts and other converbial clauses can be plausibly analyzed
as event modifiers of different kinds, it is not surprising if CPs, which bear the same
morphology, are properties of events as well.
5 Additional supporting evidence: nominalized CPs
I have argued that nominalizations I have discussed so far (the ones formed from
participles, as in (2a)) denote properties of events. In addition to these, Barguzin
Buryat also has nominalized CP clauses, (36).16
(36) badma
Badma.NOM
üst9r
yesterday
nom
book
unS-a:
read-PST
g-9:S9
say-PART.NOM
buru:
false
‘That Badma read a book yesterday is false.’
Nominalized CPs look like a finite clause embedded under the complementizer
g9 ‘say’ with the participial morphology and case marking on it. My account of the
factivity alternation with hanaxa ‘think’ makes a prediction about the interpretation
of nominalized CPs under this verb. Since I hypothesized that complementizers
are sources of quantification over possible worlds, I predict that there should be
no factive inference about the proposition embedded by the complementizer. This
prediction is borne out, (37).
16 I assume that participial nominalizations are nominalized AspPs or TPs.
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(37) dugar
Dugar.NOM
mi:sg9i-n
cat-GEN
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:
eat-PST
g-9:S-i:j9
say-PART-ACC
han-a:,
think-PST
xarin
but
mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:-güi
eat-PST-NEG
‘Dugar remembers (the claim) that the cat ate the fish, but the cat didn’t eat
the fish.’
However, one can see that the verb is still translated as ‘remember’. In (37)
what Dugar recalls is a claim / rumor / thought that has been previously made. The
presupposition of the attitude verb is still there, but it applies not to an event of the
cat eating the fish, but to an individual whose content is ‘The cat ate the fish’. Thus,
it is infelicitous to say explicitly that the proposition p was not previously mentioned:
(38) # mi:sg9i
cat.NOM
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:
eat-PST
g9-ž9
say-CONV
x9n-Sj9
who-PTCL
x9z9:-Sj9
when-PTCL
han-a:-güi,
think-PST-NEG
(xarin)
(but)
dugar
Dugar.NOM
mi:sg9i-n
cat-GEN
zagaha
fish
9dj-9:
eat-PST
g-9:S-i:j9
say-PART-ACC
han-a:
think-PST
# ‘Noone has ever thought that the cat ate the fish, (but) Dugar remembered
(the claim) that the cat ate the fish.’
This is expected if the nominalized CP denotes an individual with propositional
content17, which saturates the internal argument of the verb, thus being subject
to the pre-existence presupposition. As we have seen, this does not lead to a
factive inference, (37), since the pre-existence presupposition is associated with the
individual with propositional content (‘claim’), and not with a much more deeply
embedded event of a cat eating the fish.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed, based on data from Barguzin Buryat, that factivity
alternations can arise due to the pre-existence presupposition of attitude verbs
associated with their internal arguments. If an internal argument of a verb with
such a presupposition is saturated by an event-denoting nominalization, we get an
inference that the/an event described by the nominalization pre-exists the event
described by the verb. The factive inference is part of this inference. Following
Kratzer (2013, 2016); Elliott (2017), I have proposed that Buryat CPs combine with
the verb by modifying its event argument. Thus, no material inside of CP is related
in any way to the pre-existence presupposition, and no factive inference arises.
17 Bogal-Allbritten & Moulton (2017) discuss semantics of a similiar nominalization in Korean.
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